Abstract: This study examines whether auditor industry specialization plays a significant role in reducing clients' seasoned equity offering (SEO) underpricing. From 1,249 SEO samples covering 2001 to 2008, we find a significant and negative association between auditor industry specialization and SEO underpricing. Typically, underpricing decreases by 23.1% when the issuing firm is audited by industry specialists. We then extend our sample period to 2013 to examine whether the market evaluation of auditor industry specialization significantly changes after the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC). Our results show that the negative association between auditor industry specialization and SEO underpricing loses its statistical significance in the post-crisis period. These findings suggest that the market suspicion of the auditor's role as a market 'watchdog' leading up to the GFC significantly altered investors' perceptions of auditors and thus impaired the market evaluation of industry specialist auditors.
Introduction
Industry specialist auditors accumulate industry-specific knowledge and expertise through continuous auditing practices, extensive human capital investments, and superior information technology (Solomon et al., 1999; Francis et al., 2005) . These advantages allow them to provide high-quality audit services, as they are able to conduct more industry-relevant auditing techniques and are less likely to make errors. A large body of literature has looked into this issue and investigated the economic consequences of industry specialist auditors.
Some studies find that managers are less likely to manage earnings when audited by industry specialists and will thus provide high-quality information to the investors (Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Reichelt and Wang, 2010; DeBoskey and Jiang, 2012) . In a related development, Francis et al. (2005) report significantly positive relations between auditor industry specialization and audit fees, implying that industry specialist auditors are highly valued by client firms. Building on this stream of literature, our study examines how equity market investors appraise auditors' industry expertise in the context of seasoned equity issues.
In particular, we test whether industry specialist auditors can significantly reduce their clients' level of SEO (seasoned equity offering) underpricing.
Financial theory recognizes information asymmetry as one of the primary sources of the increase in firms' cost of equity capital. Investors who are relatively uninformed may lose from trades with informed investors, since the informed parties will engage only in good equity issues, leaving bad issues for the uninformed investors. Thus, uninformed investors ex-ante require some sort of compensation for their evident losses, which induces a higher cost of equity capital (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . A similar mechanism applies to firms' seasoned equity issues, where high information asymmetry exists among investors. In SEOs, stock-issuing firms pay compensation by offering their shares at a price lower than their intrinsic value, thereby attracting uninformed investors (Rock, 1986) . As such underpricing incurs costs to the stock-issuing firms, this highlights the importance of disseminating high-quality information in SEOs as well as the possible link between auditor quality and SEO underpricing.
Given the prior findings that industry specialist auditors provide better audit services and thus significantly increase their clients' earnings quality, it is plausible that they may serve important role in reducing the information asymmetry associated with seasoned equity-issuing firms. Specifically, competent auditors allow uninformed investors to gain access to highquality public information and induce investors to require relatively little compensation for engaging in equity trades. This leads to the prediction that industry specialist auditors may significantly reduce the stock underpricing on the SEO date.
In a similar vein, Krishnan et al. (2013) address this issue and find a negative relation between industry specialist auditors and their client firms' cost of equity capital. They demonstrate that industry specialist auditors reduce their clients' cost of equity by 20 to 30 basis points. However, since they do not explicitly show whether their findings are also applicable to new equity issuances, it is still an empirical question whether industry specialist auditors can reduce their client firms ' SEO underpricing. 1 Moreover, cautious interpretation is needed for their findings as they employ implied cost of capital measures derived from 1 Some other studies have examined the effect of audit quality on new equity issues by utilizing IPO underpricing. For instance, Titman and Trueman (1986) and Datar et al. (1991) analytically show that high-quality audits can mitigate IPO underpricing by providing useful information to equity investors. Beatty (1989) and Michaely and Shaw (1995) support those theoretical claims by providing empirical evidence that reputable auditors reduce their client firms' IPO underpricing. However, unlike our study, these studies simply use auditors' firm size as a proxy for their audit quality and fail to consider their industry expertise.
failure to provide a timely warning to market participants is considered as one of the major causes. The dysfunction of auditors has drawn a great attention from market participants and provoked strong skepticism about their role as a market 'watchdog'. For instance, former SEC accountant Lynn Turner remarked that audit quality in the U.S. significantly improved after the enactment of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act but that this improvement substantially declined in the years leading up to the financial crisis. 3, 4 Moreover, the heads of the PCAOB and SEC were called before the Senate Banking Committee in 2011 and were questioned about the auditors' share of responsibility for the GFC. At the committee, PCAOB chair James R. Doty reported that their inspection of audit performance during the financial crisis found grave deficiencies in public audit services. He also admitted that 'auditors failed to perform the work mandated by PCAOB standards' and announced several enhancement plans for inspections and enforcement.
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Along with these regulatory concerns, the crisis also gave rise to investor misgivings about auditors. Doubts were concentrated on the major accounting firms, which had been believed by investors to have superior expertise and thus provide high-quality audit services.
This was because most of the financially distressed firms had been audited by one of the large accounting firms, the so-called 'Big Four', during the crisis, and none of these auditors detected the severe risks embedded in their clients' financial statements. Sikka (2009) Auditing's key function is making independent examinations of financial statements and providing assurance to market participants that the reported financial information is credible. For this reason, auditors have been the mainstays of the capital market and have become trust-building entities. However, the many audit failures in the years leading up to the GFC may have severely damaged investors' trust in auditors and the damage appears to be most serious for those who had been seen as high-quality auditors, as their roles in the GFC greatly disappointed investors. This suggests that the onset of the GFC may have significantly impaired investors' assessment of high quality auditors (here, industry specialist auditors), leading investors to cease paying premiums for them in seasoned equity-issuing markets. In other words, the significantly negative relation between industry specialist auditors and SEO underpricing may have vanished in the post-GFC period.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the market evaluation of industry specialist auditors may not have deteriorated after the onset of the crisis. Although the GFC has induced
investors' disappointment about high-quality auditors, audit firms still play a crucial role in equity-issuing markets and thus large demand for better audit service exists. In this sense, investors from post-GFC period can still pay premiums for the auditors' industry expertise.
Moreover, recent evidence shows that the increased market scrutiny over the auditors in the post-GFC period has substantially improved the overall audit quality (Geiger et al., 2014) , implying that the negative impact of the GFC on investors' assessment of industry specialist auditors may not be substantial. 7 Therefore, how the market evaluation of industry specialist auditors changed after the GFC is an empirical question.
To answer this question, we extend our sample period to 2013 and investigate how the relation between auditor specialization and SEO underpricing changed in the post-GFC period.
Our univariate analysis finds that the difference in mean SEO underpricing between industry specialist auditor clients and non-industry specialist auditor clients becomes statistically insignificant in the post-GFC period. Our multivariate results also show that the negative 7 Geiger et al. (2014) report that the propensity of auditors to issue going-concern modified audit opinions (GCO) for their subsequently bankrupt clients significantly increased after the crisis periods.
association between industry specialist auditors and SEO underpricing loses its statistical significance in the post-crisis period. Overall, our results suggest that the impact of the GFC significantly damaged investor confidence in industry specialist auditors and thus ended the positive market evaluation of auditor industry specialization.
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, to our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the association between auditor industry specialization and the level Second, we add to the stream of literature on the economic changes around the GFC.
In line with its considerable influence over the global economy, the GFC has drawn much interest from academics, most of whom focus on aspects such as corporate investments (Duchin et al., 2010; Balakrishnan et al., 2014) (Moshirian, 2011). However, despite the crucial role auditors played in causing the GFC, only a few studies have empirically investigated the link between the GFC and auditors (Geiger et al., 2014) . Moreover, since the literature focuses on the auditors' perspective, it fails to determine whether the GFC has changed investors' assessment of auditors. Our study adds to the literature on the GFC by examining its impact on the market evaluation of high-quality auditors-the industry specialist auditors.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the sample construction and empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Section 4 presents the additional analysis results, and section 5 concludes the study. Since most of the city industry specialist auditors are among the Big 4, it is possible that our results are driven by the impact of the Big 4 auditors rather than industry specialist auditors. To avoid this possibility, we exclude any SEOs made by non-Big 4 clients (372 SEOs). However, we also run analyses including SEOs made by nonBig 4 clients and find that our results do not differ.
Sample construction and empirical methodology

Sample construction
(CIG), and analyst following data from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S).
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Our final sample comprises 2,028 SEOs made by publicly listed U.S. companies between 2001 and 2013.
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We divide our sample period into the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods using December 31, 2008 as the cutoff date. September 2008 is generally considered the month in which the GFC started in the U.S. (Geiger et al., 2014) . However, since our primary interest is the market perceptions of auditors, we delay the GFC cutoff date by three months to fully capture the impact of the GFC on investors. We also use two alternative cutoff dates to divide the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods and obtain qualitatively similar results. 12 The final sample for our main analyses consists of 2,028 SEOs, of which 1,249 (779) are made in the pre-GFC (post-GFC) period.
SEO underpricing
As in prior studies (Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Kim and Park, 2005) , we define the dependent variable, Underpricing, as a return from the offer price to the closing price on the offer date. 13 To rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by some extreme observations, we exclude observations for which the absolute value of Underpricing exceeds 0.5. 10 If issuers are not matched with any management guidance within two previous years from the SEO date, we regard such issuers as not voluntarily disclosing any earnings information before the equity offerings (Li and Zhuang, 2012) . Similarly, if there is no analyst forecast made in the year prior to the SEO, we regard it as a zero analyst-following firm (Bowen et al., 2008) . The empirical results are presented in the following section. 13 In addition, we also use an alternative measure of Underpricing, the return from the closing price on the day prior to the offer date to the offer price multiplied by -1. Overall, we confirm that our results are qualitatively similar if we use the alternative underpricing measure.
Industry specialist auditors
Auditors' industrial knowledge and expertise are gained through repeated audit experiences and thus represent individual professionals' personal knowledge. Since such personal knowledge has limited transferability, some studies argue that auditors' industry expertise is rarely shared among offices located in different cities and is better captured at the city-office level (Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt and Wang, 2010) . For instance, Francis et al. (2005) find that audit fee premiums are not paid to the national-level industry specialist auditors but to the city-office-level specialist auditors, implying that the primary source of industry expertise exists at the auditor's city-office level. Similarly, Reichelt and Wang (2010) show that auditors' effectiveness in constraining earnings management is much more pronounced in city-office-level industry specialist auditors than in national industry specialists. This study therefore follows the recent stream of auditing research and operationalizes the industry specialist auditor measure at the city-office level.
To construct the industry specialist auditor measure, we first divide all U.S. audit client firms covered by Audit Analytics into groups based on their industry (two-digit SIC), Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and year. 14 We consider each separate industry-MSAyear cohort as an independent audit market, in which the auditors compete with each other at their city-office level. For each industry-MSA-year audit market, we then rank auditors based on their total fees received from clients and regard the first ranked auditor as the city-office industry specialist auditor (Francis et al., 2005; Francis and Yu, 2009 
Empirical methodology
To answer our first research question, we run the regression model of equation (1) shown 
The dependent variable of this model, Underpricing, is defined as the return from the offer price to the closing price on the offer day. 17 MSALeader is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the SEO firm's auditor is the city-office level industry (SIC two-digit) leader by total audit fees and 0 otherwise. Given our first prediction that industry specialist auditors reduce 15 In some cases, we have only one auditor in a city-level audit market (industry-MSA-year cohort), implying that there is no competition among auditors. This may cause some problems since auditors from such audit markets are always identified as industry specialists under our definition. To alleviate this concern, we construct an alternative measure of MSALeader in which the auditors are classified as non-industry specialists when they are from the audit market with a single auditor observation. Untabulated results show that our overall findings do not vary if we use the alternative measure of industry specialist auditors. 16 Since some of our sample firms make multiple seasoned equity offers, one might argue that residuals of SEO underpricing are correlated across firms. To address this concern, we also conduct our main analyses after correcting standard errors by clustering at firm levels and find qualitatively similar results. 17 According to prior research (e.g., Corwin 2003) , stated offer dates are often inappropriate for SEO underpricing studies, as some SEOs occur after the market closes. To resolve this issue, we apply a volume-based offer date adjustment as follows. If the trading volume on the day following the stated offer date is two times greater than both 1) that on the offer date and 2) the average daily trading volume over the prior 250 trading days, the day following the stated offer date is regarded as the relevant offer date for analyzing SEO underpricing.
information asymmetry among investors and therefore lead investors to require relatively little compensation, we expect the β1, coefficient on MSALeader to be negative.
Following prior research (Bowen et al., 2008; Kim and Park, 2005 
As mentioned, if the GFC has had adverse effects on the market evaluation of high-quality auditors, we expect to find a significant and positive coefficient on MSALeader * Post-GFC.
On the contrary, if the market demand for high-quality audit services increased after the GFC leading investors to pay more premiums for industry specialists' services, we expect to observe a significant and negative coefficient on MSALeader * Post-GFC.
Panel A of Table 1 mean SEO underpricing of our total sample is 2.62 percent, similar to that seen in the literature (Corwin, 2003) .
Panel B of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables included in our main regression model. Since the purpose of this study is to examine whether investors' assessment of high-quality auditors changes after the onset of the GFC, we also report separate descriptive statistics for the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. The mean value of underpricing for the full sample is 0.026, implying that issuing firms tend to offer new equity shares at an offer price 2.6 percent lower than their intrinsic value. We also find that the mean SEO underpricing does not differ between pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. However, the standard deviation of underpricing increases after the onset of the GFC, which suggests that [Insert Table 1 Here] [Insert Table 2 Here] 
Empirical results
Univariate analysis
(LogPrePrc).
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Multivariate analysis: Effect of GFC on the relation between industry specialist auditors and SEO underpricing
In this section, we test our second research question-how the market evaluation of industry specialist auditors changed after the onset of the GFC-by running equation (2). In Table 5 , we add Post-GFC and an interaction term between MSALeader and Post-GFC along with MSALeader. First, consistent with the previous analyses, we find that the coefficients of
MSALeader in all three model specifications are significant and negative. However, significant and positive coefficients of MSALeader * Post-GFC suggest that the ability of industry specialist auditors to reduce SEO underpricing substantially declines after the onset of the GFC.
This finding is in a line with our prediction that, if the series of audit failures leading up to the GFC has significantly damaged investor trust in so-called 'high-quality' auditors, investors would have reduced the amount of premiums they pay for such auditors' services.
The next question is whether SEO firms no longer enjoy a favorable market assessment from hiring industry specialist auditors after the GFC. We check the Wald-test statistic for the sum of the coefficients on MSALeader and MSALeader * Post-GFC and find a statistically insignificant results for all three Models. For example, in Model 1, the p-value for the Waldtest statistic is 0.2246 suggesting that the capacity of hiring industry specialist auditors to reduce SEO underpricing vanishes in the post-GFC period.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Additional analyses
Controlling for earnings quality
In this section, we run a battery of additional analyses to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, we examine whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. Kim and Park (2005) argue that SEO firms tend to manage their reported earnings upward to inflate the offer price of issuing stock, which in turn reduces the level of SEO underpricing. Therefore, in Models 1 and 2 of 
Including non-Big 4 clients
In the main analyses, we follow prior studies and restrict our samples to the Big 4 auditor clients in order to remove the effect of non-Big 4 auditors from that of industry specialist auditors and construct more homogenous SEO samples (Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan et al., 2003; DeBoskey and Jiang, 2012 18 Some might still claim that our findings are attributable to unobservable firm characteristics. To address this concern, we re-examine our baseline regression model after including firm-level dummy variables. The untabulated results reveal that our findings remain intact after controlling for firm fixed effects. For instance, the coefficient estimate of MSALeader (MSALeader*Post-GFC) is significant and negative (positive), and the Waldtest statistic for the sum of the coefficients on MSALeader and MSALeader * Post-GFC is statistically insignificant, suggesting that our main findings are not driven by the omitted variables problem. However, since a majority of our sample firms has a single SEO event, the results of the firm-fixed effects model must be interpreted with caution.
in our main analyses. In this section, we run an additional test to see whether our results remain constant when non-Big 4 clients are included. The inclusion of non-Big 4 clients increases our sample by 372, producing 2,400 SEO observations in total. In Models 3 to 4 of Table 6 , we find coefficients on independent variables that are consistent with our main results. Specifically, we find significantly negative coefficients of MSALeader, while the Wald-test statistic for the sum of the coefficients on MSALeader and MSALeader * Post-GFC is not significant.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Alternative GFC cutoff dates and the exclusion of transition periods
To further substantiate the main findings of this study, we employ alternative GFC cutoff dates to redefine the Post-GFC variable and examine whether our results remain robust after changing the classifications of the post-GFC periods. In our main analyses, we identify Table 7 report the results of our main regression using the alternative GFC cutoff dates. In both cases, we find significant and negative (positive) coefficients of MSALeader (MSALeader * Post-GFC), consistent with our main findings. Moreover, the Wald-test results for the sum of the coefficients on
MSALeader and MSALeader * Post-GFC are both statistically insignificant, implying that the effect of MSALeader in reducing SEO underpricing vanishes after the onset of the GFC.
Another possible concern is that the impact of the GFC on investor assessments of auditors was transitory and did not last. We thus exclude the SEO samples from the transition period (2009) during which the crisis was still ongoing and re-estimate our main regression model. In the untabulated results, we find that the coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar.
The Wald-test result for the sum of the coefficients on MSALeader and MSALeader * Post-GFC loses its statistical significance (p-value 0.1769) while the coefficient on MSALeader is significantly negative (coefficient -0.007, p-value 0.0157). Collectively, our additional analysis results suggest that the main finding of this study is neither sensitive to the classification of GFC cutoff dates nor transitory.
Excluding pre-SOX period samples
In [Insert Table 7 Here]
Propensity score matching
Since a SEO firm's choice of ISAs may not be exogenously given, we adopt the propensity score matching technique to control for the endogenous nature of auditor choice.
We estimate the propensity score by running a logistic regression model in which the dependent variable is MSALeader. The explanatory variables used in our logistic regression model are firm size (LnTA), profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), asset turnover (sales deflated by total assets), and all control variables included in our baseline regression model of equation (1). 19 The predicted value from our logistic regression model, referred to as propensity score, is interpreted as the estimated probability of hiring industry specialist auditors regardless of whether they actually hire such auditors. Using the estimated propensity scores, we then match an ISA client firm with a non-ISA client firm with the closest score within a maximum distance (the so-called 'caliper distance') of 3 percent. The regression results using the propensity score matched sample are reported in Table 8 . In both Model 1 and 2, we find that the coefficients of MSALeader are still negative and statistically significant. In Model 2, the coefficient estimate on MSALeader * Post-GFC is significant and positive, indicating that the effect of industry specialist auditors in reducing SEO underpricing decreases in the post-GFC period.
Furthermore, the insignificant Wald-test statistic for the sum of MSALeader and MSALeader * Post-GFC implies that the effect of industry specialist auditors vanishes in the post-GFC period.
Overall, our results from the propensity score matching corroborate the main findings of this study.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
Conclusion
We have examined whether industry specialist auditors play a significant role in reducing their client firms' SEO underpricing. By focusing on the pre-GFC period and measuring the auditors' industry expertise at their city-office level, we find a significant and negative association between industry specialist auditors and SEO underpricing. This suggests that auditors with industry expertise relieve the information asymmetry problems associated with SEOs and thereby reduce SEO firms' cost of equity capital. Next, we extend our sample period to 2013 and investigate whether our finding of a negative relation between industry specialist auditors and SEO underpricing changes after the onset of the GFC. Our results show that the ability of industry specialist auditors to reduce SEO underpricing no longer exists in the post-GFC period, consistent with our conjecture that the outbreak of the GFC aroused market suspicion of the assurance service provided by so-called 'high-quality' auditors and thus induced investors to cease paying premiums for such auditors in seasoned equity issuing markets.
Our findings contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we extend the literature by, first, investigating the association between auditor industry specialization and the level of SEO underpricing. Furthermore, we corroborate the findings of Krishnan et al. (2013) by utilizing an experimental setting of SEO that is free from measurement errors. Second, we add to the literature on the GFC by focusing on auditors. Despite the large body of evidence that the auditors' failure to detect substantial risks embedded in clients' financial statements triggered the GFC, few studies have examined this issue. We fill this void by showing that the onset of the GFC substantially changed the market evaluation of industry specialist auditors and that SEO market investors no longer pay premiums for their services.
Appendix A Variable Definition Underpricing Return from offer price to the closing price on the offer day.
MSALeader
Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the SEO firm's auditor is the citylevel industry (SIC two-digit) leader by audit fees and 0 otherwise.
Post-GFC
Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the SEO is made during the post-GFC period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) and 0 otherwise.
FcstDum
Indicator variable with a value of 1 if managers provide voluntary disclosures within two years prior to the SEO date and 0 otherwise.
Integer
Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the offering price is an integer value and 0 otherwise.
NASDAQ
Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the SEO firm is listed on NASDAQ and 0 otherwise.
Offersize
Number of shares offered divided by the total number of shares outstanding on the day prior to the SEO date.
LogMV
Natural logarithm of total market capitalization.
StdRet
Standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year prior to the SEO.
LogPrePrc
Natural logarithm of closing price on the day prior to the SEO date.
LogCov
Natural logarithm of number of analyst following.
PreVcarPos
Value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns over the five days prior to SEO date if it is positive and 0 otherwise.
PreVcarNeg
Value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns over the five days prior to SEO date if it is negative and 0 otherwise.
Shelf
Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the SEO is shelf-registered and 0 otherwise.
PMJDA
Performance-matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2005) . Kothari et al. (2005) . In Models 3 to 4, SEOs made by non-Big 4 auditor clients are included in our sample. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects are controlled in regression models. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels., *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of .10, .05, and .01 respectively. et al. (2011) . The dependent variable Underpricing is the return from the offer price to the closing price on the offer day. Post-GFC is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the SEO is made between 2009 and 2013 and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects are controlled in regression models. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of .10, .05, and .01 respectively,
